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ABSTRACT

Patent prosecution is becoming more complex with every new rule,
statute, and court decision. Rather than approaching the changes
with a glass-is-half-empty view, the author explains why this
development is a boon to the importance of skilled patent
prosecutors. The author reviews the latest developments that have
given added scrutiny to the patent drafting process and provides
nine tips to assist patent prosecution in the current environment.

Copyright © 2003 The John Marshall Law School
Cite as 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 34

CREATIVE CLAIM DRAFTING: CLAIM DRAFTING STRATEGIES,
SPECIFICATION PREPARATION, AND PROSECUTION TACTICS
GEORGE

F. WHEELER*

INTRODUCTION

Every year, patent prosecution becomes more difficult. Rule changes, new
statutes, and case law developments add complexity to the law. At the same time,
the demand for good patent prosecutors has never been greater, as patents have
increased vastly in importance since I started practicing patent law in 1977. This is
not to say that patent prosecution was ever easy. The United States Supreme Court
recognized in the nineteenth century that patent prosecution is exceedingly difficult:
The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at
all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to
draw with accuracy, and in view of the fact that valuable inventions are
often placed in the hands of inexperienced persons to prepare such
specifications and claims, it is no matter of surprise that the latter
frequently fail to describe with requisite certainty the exact invention of the
patentee, and err either in claiming that which the patentee had not in fact
invented, or in omitting some element which was a valuable or essential
part of his actual invention.1
Before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the
"Federal Circuit") was founded in 1982, patents were less important economically
than they are now. This is largely because a large proportion of them were found
invalid or unenforceable. 2 In addition, damages for infringement are considerably
higher now than in 1982. 3 Many companies would choose to "roll the dice" and
infringe a patent without taking a license. Even if the patent successfully enforced,
the recovery would probably be a modest license royalty.
Before the 1980's, patent prosecution was a small art practiced by a few people,
for the most part attracting little attention. Patents were rarely in the news. Most of
the big general practice law firms didn't have patent attorneys at all, for litigation or
* LL.M., The John Marshall Law School, 1991, J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1977, B.S.
Chemistry, University of Wisconsin, 1974. Mr. Wheeler is a partner at McAndrews, Held, & Malloy,
Chicago, Illinois. He is admitted to practice before the Wisconsin, Ohio, and Illinois bars, and
registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. He has served as the
Chair of the Chemical Practice Committee of the AIPLA. Mr. Wheeler previously worked for a total
of nine years as an in-house patent attorney for The Proctor & Gamble Company and Morton
Thiokol, Inc.
1 Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892); see also, Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383

(1963).
2 Many

patents were found unenforceable for "misuse," a defense that rarely prevails today.
See Paul M. Janicke, Contomporary-ssuos in PatentDamages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691, 693
(1993) (noting the increase in damage awards in the first ten years of the Federal Circuit's
existence).
3
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prosecution. They left that type of work to the attorneys in small patent firms. For
the patent bar, big general practice firms were fertile referral sources, not
competitors.
The Federal Circuit changed all this when it was created in 1982 to hear all
patent appeals. 4 Patents were much more likely to be found valid in the Federal
Circuit. In the early days patents were also more likely to be held infringed,
particularly under an expansive doctrine of equivalents. Damages recoveries
rocketed, and the big general practice firms fought to obtain lucrative patent
litigation work.
Patent jury trials came into vogue, and became a vehicle for sidestepping legal
analysis. Cases were put into the jury "black box," and juries proved to be more propatentee than judges and were willing to award large verdicts, which often were
affirmed on appeal. 5 At this time, claims were less important than before, since all
one needed to support a jury verdict was some basis on which a reasonable juror
could find infringement. The principal issues, including claim construction, either
directly or indirectly turned on questions of fact, resolved by juries. Moreover, expert
testimony by technological experts and patent experts could often be used to "spin"
the meaning of the words of a claim.
More recently, the pendulum has reversed course again. Patents still are far
more often found valid than invalid, and rarely are found unenforceable, whether for
inequitable conduct or for patent misuse. However, patent trials are increasingly
being taken away from juries by the aggressive use of summary judgments, and it is
much more difficult to prove infringement than it once was. An enormous damage
judgment is not unusual for infringement on a large scale, but first the patent must
be found both valid and infringed.
Probably the biggest reason for this shift is the realization that, when the fate of
a patent was in the hands of a jury, opponents of the patent had great difficulty
deciding just how widely they had to circumvent the patent to avoid its reach. How
would a jury of lay people interpret the claims (or would they even pay any attention
to them)? Who would the jury regard as wearing the "white hat"? Could the experts
convince the jury that the true meaning of the claim was far from its plain meaning?
7
6
Recently, the Federal Circuit's and Supreme Court's Markman, Hilton-Davis,
and FesOt decisions, as well as others, have placed great emphasis on the "notice"
function of the patent and its prosecution history. Now, following the Markman9
decision, judges decide what the claims mean, and they do so in great detail. The
"plain meaning" of the claim is the principal focus of analysis:

4 The Heil Co. v. Snyder Ind., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 422, 424 (D. Neb., 1991).
5 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases - An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000).
6 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
7 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), revd.,
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
8 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Festo A1,rev'd, 535 U.S. 722 (2002) [hereinafter Festo Il, on remand, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Festo111].
9 Markman, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cr. 1995).
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First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and
nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention.... [Words in a
claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning ....10
"There is a heavy presumption" that claim terms "mean what they say and have
the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in
the relevant art."1 1
Recently, the Federal Circuit has placed great emphasis on the use of general
dictionaries to construe the claims. 12 For ordinary words that have no specialized
meanings, "standard dictionaries of the English language are the proper source of
ordinary meaning of the phrase." 13 Technical dictionaries, encyclopedias and
treatises "may be used for establishing specialized meanings in particular fields of
art."14 The relevant definitions of the claim terms are those in resources published as
15
of the date the patents issued, whether in dictionaries, encyclopedias or treatises.
Unless compelled otherwise, a court will give a claim term the full range of its
ordinary meaning as understood by persons skilled in the relevant art. 16 Where
there is more than one possibly pertinent dictionary definition for a word, it may be
construed to encompass each alternative, except to the extent the specification or
prosecution history clearly demonstrates that one or more of the multiple meanings
was not intended.17
Because words often have multiple dictionary definitions, some having no
relation to the claimed invention, the intrinsic record must always be
consulted to identify which of the different possible dictionary meanings of
the claim terms in issue is most consistent with the use of the words by the
inventor .... [Tihe intrinsic record also must be examined in every case to
determine whether the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is
rebutted [by an explicit definition of the term different from its ordinary
meaning].... The presumption [that a term has its ordinary meaning] also
will be rebutted if the inventor has disavowed or disclaimed scope of
coverage, by using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction,
18
representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.

10Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted);
accord, Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 1365, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
11Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
12 Warner Lambert, 309 F.3d at 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Princeton Biomediteeh, 309 F.3d at
1369; Texas DigitalSys., 308 F.3d at 1202-03.
13 Warner Lambert, 309 F.3d at 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Princeton Biomeditech, 309 F.3d at

1369.
14

Warner Lambert, 309 F.3d at 1378.
1378; PrincetonBiomeditech, 309 F.3d at 1370; Texas DigitalSys., 308 F.3d at 1202-

15 Jd. at

03.
16Id.

at 1203.

17Warner Lambert, 309 F.3d at 1379.
18

Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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"As resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in the
understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely proper for both trial and
appellate judges to consult [dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] at any stage of
a litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or
not. Thus, categorizing them as 'extrinsic evidence' or even 'a special form of
extrinsic evidence' is misplaced and does not inform the analysis." 19 "[T]he patent
disclosure serves to point away from the improper meanings and toward the proper
meanings." 20 The prosecution history "cannot be used to limit the scope of a claim
unless the applicant took a position before the [United States Patent and Trademark
Office leading one skilled in the art] to believe that the applicant had disavowed
coverage of the relevant subject matter." 21
Once the claims are construed as a matter of law, few if any material issues of
fact regarding infringement usually remain. If infringement is not literal, the
doctrine of equivalents is harder to prove than ever. The doctrine of equivalents is
applied claim element by claim element, and not to the claim as a whole, which
narrows the doctrine's reach considerably. 22 And of course, the doctrine of
equivalents narrowly escaped death after the Supreme Court's Festo decision,23
although it is not yet clear how often the doctrine of equivalents will be applied,
particularly if the claim limitation in question has been narrowed during prosecution
of the patent in suit.
Therefore, one has a much better chance of figuring out what the claims of a
patent mean today, and whether the patentee or its opponent should win. I submit
that a competitor of the patentee has much better notice than before of the metes and
bounds of the patented invention, aided by review of the specification and
prosecution history, and with the help of dictionaries and treatises. That is precisely
what the current Federal Circuit is trying very hard to achieve.
One of the early Federal Circuit cases emphasizing the "public notice function"
of claims is Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. 24 Some of the Federal
Circuit's more telling reasoning in that case is as follows:
Applied more broadly, the doctrine would conflict with the primacy of the
claims in defining the scope of a patentee's exclusive rights. Thus, for a
patentee who has claimed an invention narrowly, there may not be
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in many cases, even though
the patentee might have been able to claim more broadly. If it were
otherwise, then claims would be reduced to functional abstracts, devoid of
meaningful structural limitations on which the public could rely .

. .

. If

Sage desired broad patent protection for any container that performed a
function similar to its claimed container, it could have sought claims with
19Id. at 1203.

20 WarnerLambert,309 F.3d at 1378 (citations omitted).
21 Id. at 1382.
22 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520

U.S. 17, 29 (1997). "Each element
contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and
thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the
invention as a whole." Id.
23 Festo l 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
24 Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus. Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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fewer structural encumbrances . . . . Instead, Sage left the PTO with
manifestly limited claims that it now seeks to expand through the doctrine
of equivalents.
However, as between the patentee who had a clear
opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at
large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek
protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure .... This
court recognizes that such reasoning places a premium on forethought in
patent drafting. Indeed this premium may lead to higher costs of patent
prosecution. However, the alternative rule - allowing broad play for the
doctrine of equivalents to encompass foreseeable variations, not just of a
claim element, but of a patent claim - also leads to higher costs. Society at
large would bear these latter costs in the form of virtual foreclosure of
competitive activity within the penumbra of each issued patent claim ....
Given a choice of imposing the higher costs of careful prosecution on
patentees, or imposing the costs of foreclosed business activity on the public
at large, this court believes the costs are properly imposed on the group best
positioned to determine whether or not a particular invention warrants
investment at a higher level, that is, the patentees. 25
Returning to the status of patent prosecution today, I submit that the water
glass is half-full, not half-empty. The Federal Circuit, in Sage and many other cases,
has put the onus on the prosecutor to write claims that are infringed, without resort
in most cases to the doctrine of equivalents, - the part of the glass occupied by air.
The water in the glass is the Federal Circuit's view that if a patent owner wants
better claims it must pay for the work necessary to obtain them. That is nothing less
than a patent prosecutor's full employment act. The only people who can prosecute
patent applications are registered patent attorneys and agents, and only a fraction of
the lawyers in the world who call themselves "IP" lawyers are registered patent
attorneys.
In other words, you can either look at this extra scrutiny of the patent drafting
process as a problem or as an opportunity to make a very good living by developing a
high level of skill in patent drafting and prosecution. I prefer the latter view. What
follows are nine tips, some of which are variations of well-known themes and others
of which come strictly from my own thought and experience.

I. WRITE CLAIMS THAT WILL BE LITERALLY INFRINGED
The first tip I have to offer is that the doctrine of equivalents is a long shot.
Certainly, it makes sense for litigators to rely on the doctrine of equivalents when
they get into trouble, as with an adverse claim construction, and they are reaching
down to the bottom of their bag of tricks. But in my view, prosecutors should not
spend most of their time writing claims with the objective of obtaining broader
coverage than their literal scope under the doctrine of equivalents. Work hard to get
the broadest claims available and a desirable range of narrower claims to protect
25 Sage,

126 F.3d at 1424-25 (citations omitted).

[3:034:2003]

Creative Claim Drafting

against invalidity attacks, rather than pulling your punches in hope of producing a
claim that is literally narrow as printed in the patent but effectively broad in
litigation.
For the last four years, I have reviewed all the precedential Federal Circuit
cases addressing the doctrine of equivalents. My methodology was not sophisticated,
and precedential cases are the tip of the iceberg. 26 Nonetheless, the results I
obtained are illuminating.
Even before Festo was decided en bane by the Federal Circuit (Festo J),27 few
cases were being won based on the doctrine of equivalents. In 1999, the year when
28
the panel initially deciding the Festo case found infringement by equivalents, I
found eleven precedential Federal Circuit cases determining the patentee's rights
under the doctrine of equivalents. Infringement was found in only three of those
cases, one of which was the Festo panel decision later overturned en bane. So the
odds were only two out of eleven, less than twenty percent, in 1999. That's a long
shot.
Of all precedential Federal Circuit cases for 2000, most if not all of which were
decided before Festo I was published, I found twenty precedential cases discussing
the doctrine of equivalents. I found no infringement by equivalents in any case,
though several cases were remanded for further consideration of this issue. The odds
that year, based on my survey, were zero percent. There was essentially no doctrine
of equivalents in the Federal Circuit in 2000, even before Festo Iwas decided.
In 2001, in the wake of Festo 1,29 I found thirty-seven precedential cases that
discussed the doctrine of equivalents. Of these, infringement under the doctrine of
30
equivalents was found in only two cases, and was denied in twenty-six cases.
That's a success rate of two out of twenty-eight, or about seven percent. Those are
certainly poor odds.
In 2002, the year of the Supreme Court Festo decision (Festo 17)31, I counted
seventeen precedential Federal Circuit decisions addressing the doctrine of
equivalents. Of these cases, eight decided the issue of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, while nine cases were remanded by the Federal Circuit on
this issue. Infringement was found under the doctrine of equivalents in only one case
(affirming the court below). In seven cases the Federal Circuit denied application of
the doctrine of equivalents. Thus, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
was found one time in eight. Even though in last year's Festo decision, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the importance of the doctrine of equivalents to the patent system,
the doctrine of equivalents remains a long shot.
The Supreme Court's Festo H decision has given the doctrine of equivalents a
relatively small role, in my view. True, amending a claim does not work as an
absolute bar.3 2 But there are more grounds than before for finding an amendment
26See Appellant's Petition for Certiorari, Southern Clay Prods., Inc. v.United Catalysts Inc., 43
Fed. Appx. 379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (criticizing the designation of Federal Circuit opinions as "nonprecedential."), cert. dlenied, 123 S.Ct. 1259 (2003).
27Festo, 234 F.3d 558.

28Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
29Festo 1 234 F.3d 558.
30Several cases were remanded for further consideration of this issue.
'31FestolH, 535 U.S. 722.
32 Festo If 535 U.S. at 736.
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creates an estoppel. Any amendment made for "reasons relating to patentability"
33
other than avoiding the prior art creates an estoppel.
Whatever the influence of Festo II as the law develops, the doctrine of
equivalents remains what it has always been - an exceptional doctrine to right a
34
manifest wrong at the expense of the notice function of claims.
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the
rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent
claims can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply
the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend
protection beyond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve
their intended purpose. Competitors will never know whether their actions
35
infringe a granted patent.
If a patentee wants the best available protection, the retained patent prosecutor
must do the work of discovering the available protection in view of the prior art and
obtaining the broadest possible claims to literally cover the invention and reasonably
foreseeable variants. Many narrower but non-trivial claims should be provided as
fallback positions in case better prior art is found after the patent issues. This
usually happens if the patent is worth fighting over. There are several specific steps
you can take to accomplish this goal. Some of the following tips may help.

II. DON'T RELY MAINLY ON MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS; WRITE BROADER
CLAIMS

Too

"Means plus function" claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6, has not been a safe
harbor for patent holders, for the most part. I will not discuss all the complexities of
means-plus-function law and practice here, but I did a survey similar to that for
doctrine of equivalents above to get some idea of the odds that a means-plus-function
claim will be found infringed. In 2000, seventy-five percent of all the precedential
Federal Circuit cases I found determining whether means-plus-function clauses were
infringed found no infringement. So the typical means-plus-function claim, which
commonly is not supported by an extensive recitation of equivalents in the
specification, is a long shot as well.
At the beginning of my career, I was taught to use means-plus-function language
as a way to expand the literal words used in the claim to cover equivalents. For
example, if part A is attached to part B by a rivet in my disclosed embodiment, I was
taught to refer to "rivet means," instead of just a rivet, to expand the claim to cover
the equivalents of rivets. Regardless of what was written in the specification, this

34

Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

("The doctrine of equivalents . . . exists solely for the equitable purpose of 'preventing an infringer
from stealing the benefit of an invention.'"); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) ("[T]he doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the
definitional and public notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.").
3 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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was thought to include other fasteners such as screws and nails, and possibly even
adhesives, welding, or duct tape, if the finder of fact was inclined to be liberal.
The modern case-law reads 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 literally. The scope of
equivalents is limited to what is disclosed in the specification and its equivalents. In
the Federal Circuit, the scope of these equivalents has been narrow.
Section 112 . . . permits means-plus-function language in a combination

claim, but with a "string attached." The "attached string" limits the applicant
to the structure, material, or acts in the specification and their equivalents.
Indeed the section operates more like the reverse doctrine of equivalents than
the doctrine of equivalents because it restricts the coverage of literal claim
36
language.
A solid means-plus-function claim is just as difficult to draft as any other type of
claim. It just moves more of the effort to drafting the specification. 37 But functional
language can be used to great advantage without using means-plus-function clauses.
[Tihe fact
defined in
containing
within the

that a particular mechanism - here "detent mechanism" - is
functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element
that term into a "means for performing a specified function"
meaning of section 112(6).38

"A functional limitation must be evaluated and considered, just like any other
limitation of the claim, for what it fairly conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art in the context in which it is used." 39 Avoiding the use of means-plusfunction language is relatively straightforward - the claim is generally not in means40
plus-function format if it simply does not use the actual word "means."
For example, the following is presumed to be, and plainly is, a means-plusfunction clause limited to the specific structure disclosed in the specification and its
equivalents:
* Means for joining the panel A to the housing B.
Even if you can't come up with anything else, you will at least technically make
an opponent's challenge more difficult by changing the above to:
* An element for joining the panel A to the housing B.
This phrase is problematical, however, as it is entirely analogous to a meansplus-function claims, reciting a nonspecific structural word ("element") followed by a
function performed by the element. 4 1 So go a step further by reciting:
* A fastener for joining the panel A to the housing B.

'36Valmont

Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
See infra Section III.
'38Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
37
3

See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

[hereinafter MPEP] § 2173.05(g) (8th ed. 2003).
40 Greenberg; 91 F.3d at 1583.
41 See Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (interpreting "a
lever moving element for moving the lever from its disengaged position" as a meansplusfunction
clause, despite the fact that it does not recite "means").
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This formulation almost certainly is not a means-plus-function clause, as the
word "fastener," though a marker for any discrete structure that accomplishes the
aim of fastening, is a well-known name for a limited range of structures. 42 Still, one
would be wise as a patent prosecutor, not to simply assume that this claim covers
welding, glue, an interference fit, clamps, or other fastening modalities. One can
end-run this problem entirely by refocusing the clause to directly recite the condition
of A and B, instead of worrying about how that condition is achieved. The claim
could thus recite:
0 The panel A joined to the housing B.
I would expect this clause to cover any way to join a panel to a housing, whether
employing fasteners, glue, welding, an interference fit, etc., particularly with an
expansively written specification. 43 It is certainly not a means-plus-function clause,
as it does not cite any element nonspecifically, though it does indirectly define a
function that must be performed by some structure.
You can go even further, to avoid the argument that the panel A and housing B
must be originally separate parts, by changing the above language to:
* The panel A forming a part of the housing B
or
* The panel A of the housing B.
As the preceding bullet points illustrate, one good way to write a clause of a
claim, or an entire claim, is to write a statement descriptive of the embodiment the
inventor has described, then start a new line and rewrite the statement to take out a
limitation, claim language, or something else that, on further study could be avoided,
and continuing the process through several iterations. This is in essence writing
your claims backward by starting with a narrow claim and progressively broadening
it.
Therefore, don't write the first independent claim that comes to mind, such as a
means-plus-function claim, and then put the rest of your attention immediately
toward the goal of writing narrower claims. Instead, write what seems to be a
suitable claim, then work on successive iterations to broaden it. As you write each
claim, stop to think how you would attempt to circumvent it if you were a third party
trying to design around it. Then think of a broader claim that avoids that designaround without reading on the prior art. When you are done, you will have written a
better independent claim. You can use the limitations of earlier versions to write
dependent claims.

III. WRITE THE SPECIFICATION EXPANSIVELY
The Federal Circuit, in Gentry Gallery44 Tronzo45 and other decisions, has
focused new attention on the scope of disclosure needed in the specification of a
patent to support broad claims, even in mechanical cases. "It is a truism that a claim
need not be limited to a preferred embodiment[,] [hiowever, in a given case, the scope of
42

See Greenberg,91 F.3d 1580.

43 See infra Section III.

4 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
4" Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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the right to exclude may be limited by a narrow disclosure." 46 The Federal Circuit
often limits the plain meaning of a claim when there is limited disclosure, or worse
yet, an indication that some feature not addressed by the claim is either essential or
prohibited. You can do several things to avoid these difficulties.
First, convey in your specification that there are many ways to carry out the
invention. Challenge the inventors to conceive several different embodiments of the
invention, with many different features. Describe more than one embodiment when
you can do so.
Even if the inventor has provided only a single embodiment, you can introduce
broadening language showing that many variations are contemplated. This is
particularly important when writing means-plus-function claims. Going back to the
preceding example, 47 in addition to reciting the obvious fact that the rivet C joins the
panel A to the housing B in Figure 1, brainstorm a little. State that, instead of a
rivet, the panel A could be joined to the housing B in a variety of ways, as by
fasteners of any type, glue, an interference fit, the weight of one resting on the other,
etc. You might also mention welding or any other way you can think of that is known
to those skilled in the art. Then when your competitor comes up with a fastening
modality not specifically stated, like binding A and B together with rope, your claims
may well be held to include binding with rope, even though you did not think of this
specific possibility when writing the specification. In other words, even if no one can
think of every possibility, be sure to convey that you have defined the invention to
allow for many different possibilities.
A court may read a lot into the disclosure of only a single embodiment in the
specification:
The specification shows only a structure whereby the restriction ring is
"part of' the cover, in permanent attachment. This is not simply the
preferred embodiment; it is the only embodiment ....This is not a case of
limiting the claims to a "preferred embodiment" of an invention that has
been more broadly disclosed .... Nor is this a case of limiting claims to
immaterial details of a broader invention as set forth in the specification...
48
•The summary judgment of literal infringement is reversed.
In Toro, the claim language, "said cover including means for increasing the
pressure," where the "means" described in the specification was a "restriction ring,"
was interpreted such that the restriction ring must be attached to the cover as shown
in the specification. 49 So think of other variations, particularly for any element that
will be recited in the claims.
Second, couch anything specific in terms of "in this embodiment..
or "in one
aspect of the invention," and certainly do not exclude alternatives outside the
disclosed embodiment. Don't follow the lead of the prosecutor who wrote the
specifications of the patents litigated in the SciMedcase.50 In SciMed,the prosecutor
16

Gentry Gallely, 134 F.3d at 1479.

47See supra Section II.
48

Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Ind., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

49Id.

at 1302 (emphasis added).
50SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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wrote a disclaimer in the specification, conceding subject matter that could have
otherwise fallen within the scope of the claim language. He wrote: "The intermediate
sleeve structure defined above is the basic sleeve structure for all embodiments of the
present invention contemplated and disclosed herein .... "51
The Federal Circuit held, as a result: "This language defines SciMed's invention
in a way that excludes the dual, or side-by-side, lumen arrangement." 52 The SciMed
prosecutor finished the job by writing the rest of the specification consistent with his
disclaimer:
SciMed argues that the references to the annular inflation lumen are meant
only to refer to the preferred embodiment of the invention, and not to indicate
that the claims should be construed as limited to a structure employing
coaxial lumens. That argument, however, flies in the face of the many
statements in the written description that define "the invention" as
employing a coaxial lumen structure and distinguish the prior art in part on
the ground that it used a dual lumen structure, which had [stated
disadvantages] .53
To avoid undue limitation of your claims to the disclosed embodiments, you
obviously should avoid writing disclaimers in your specification. Broad claims will be
read consistent with any clearly limiting language in the specification. Additionally,
don't recite that "the invention" has certain features. State that "this embodiment"
employs the features, and where the context permits, state that other embodiments
without these features are contemplated as well. Avoid using mandatory language in
the specification; use exemplary and broadening language instead.
Also, consider leaving out a recitation of "objects of the invention." I learned to
always recite objects of the invention in every patent application. Since then, I
occasionally still recite objects, usually only if I am working for someone who is used
to seeing them. It occurred to me one day that I never heard of a patent being found
invalid or not infringed for lack of a recitation of objects, or valid or infringed because
objects were recited. Objects usually are redundant of the background and summary
sections of the specification, and can become a problem in litigation if any are not met
by the accused structure.
As the disclosure states, identifying the only purpose relevant to the console,
"another object of the present invention is to provide ... a console positioned
between [the reclining seats] that accommodates the controls for both of the
reclining seats." Thus, locating the controls anywhere but on the console is
54
outside the stated purpose of the invention.

,' U.S. Patent No. 5,156,594 (issued Oct. 20, 1992) at col. 8,11 3-14; U.S. Patent No. 5,217,482
(issued June 8, 1993) at col. 8, 116-17; U.S. Patent No. 5,395,334 (issued March 7, 1995) at col. 8, 11
18-29.
52 SciIed, 242 F.3d at 1343.
5 Td. at 1343-44.
51 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).

[3:034:2003]

Creative Claim Drafting

If you do recite objects, make them modest, and state that no particular object
needs to be entirely satisfied. If you state more than one object, make it clear that
they are alternatives. A formulation I have used, when stating objects, is to recite the
following after the objects:
* At least one of the preceding objects is met, in whole or in part, by the
present invention, in which [then proceeding to summarize the
invention].
This statement is much better than the statement in the Gentry patent
"[f]rom the foregoing description it will be appreciated that the sectional sofa of this
invention accomplishes all of the objects of this invention set forth above." 55 This is
not to say that you cannot state what are the objects of the invention, although you
will do better to instead state its potential advantages, again making clear that the
invention is not limited to an embodiment having all the stated advantages to the
highest degree.

IV. CLAIM IN A CIRCLE, NOT A CHAIN
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) recommends claiming
in a chain, from broad to narrow.
Many of the difficulties encountered in the prosecution of patent applications
after final rejection may be alleviated if each applicant includes, at the time
of filing or no later than the first response, claims varying from the broadest
to which he or she believes he or she is entitled to the most detailed that he or
she is willing to accept.
Claims should preferably be arranged in order of scope so that the first
56
claim presented is the broadest.
In other words, claim 2 depends from independent claim 1, claim 3 depends from
claim 2, claim 4 depends from claim 3, and so forth. Claim 1 is the broadest claim
you are brave enough to assert, and the last claim is supposedly the narrowest you
are willing to accept.
This practice results in a one-dimensional claim set that is easy for the PTO to
examine. The examiner searches claim 1. If the examiner finds good prior art the
examiner goes on to claim 2, claim 3, and so forth until the examiner can no longer
find good enough prior art to make a rejection of a particular claim. Let us assume
that claim 6 is the first one to survive scrutiny. The examiner rejects claims 1-5,
finds allowable subject matter in claims 6-10, turns in the office action, and stops.
Making the examiner's job easier certainly is commendable, but claiming a chain
makes the patent much easier to avoid, in many instances.
One obvious problem with this approach is that it invites the examiner to keep
going far down the chain of claims; the examiner assumes you are willing to accept
even the last claim in line. That is not to say that you should never write a chain of
dependent claims. From the patentee's point of view, a chain of claims is fine for
U.S. Patent No. 5,064,244 (issued Nov. 12, 1991) at col. 4,11 48-50.
,16MPEP, supra note 39, at § 608.01(m) (emphasis added).
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expressing gradations of the same limitation. But a single chain of dependent claims
introducing different types of limitations will inherently lack some claims of broad or
intermediate scope that you should be asserting if you want broad protection, and
will contain many claims so narrow that they may be of little use in litigation.
Below is an illustration of the limitations of chain claiming, which is not a
problem in these claims:
1.
A vehicle having at least one wheel.
2.
The vehicle of claim 1, having at least two wheels.
3.
The vehicle of claim 2, having at least three wheels.
4.
The vehicle of claim 3, having at least four wheels.
Each claim recites a subset of the same limitation in the previous claim. If you
are practicing the limitation of claim 4 (four wheels), you necessarily are practicing
the limitations of all the preceding claims (respectively, three wheels, two wheels,
and one wheel).
Of course, it is not necessary to write the above claims as a chain. They also can
be written in "wheel and spoke" format, which I am calling a "circle" here, in which
each dependent claim or "spoke" separately depends from claim 1, the "hub":
1.
I claim a vehicle having at least one wheel.
2.
The vehicle of claim 1, having at least two wheels.
3.
The vehicle of claim 1, having at least three wheels.
4.
The vehicle of claim 1, having at least four wheels.
The chain format and the circle format are equivalent in the above examples; the
only difference is a matter of style. Of course, if you are enforcing one of these
dependent claims in court, the claim chart is also shorter and easier to follow if you
use the circle format.
The chain approach can get you into trouble, however, if you have more than one
type of feature that might make a dependent claim patentable if the independent
claim is not. For example, consider the following chain of claims:
1.
A vehicle.
2.
Claim 1, with wheels.
3.
Claim 2, with a door.
4.
Claim 3, with a sunroof.
5.
Claim 4, with a headlight.
6.
Claim 5, with a motor.
Assume further that the examiner finds claims 5 and 6 patentable but rejects
claims 1-4, so a patent issues containing claims 5 (i.e. the combination of claims 1 + 2
+ 3 + 4 + 5) and claim 6 (i.e. the combination of 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6). The problem
with this chain of claims is that the claims were allowed for the single reason that
they require a vehicle having a headlight, which evidently is not shown by the prior
art. These claims contain other limitations (wheels, a door, and a sunroof) that may
not have been necessary to allowance, but are necessary to infringe the claims.
These surplus limitations give those skilled in the art avenues to design around.
In the above example, the allowed claims (5 and 6) can be designed around by
providing a vehicle that has a headlight but not a sunroof. The claims can also be
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designed around by providing a hovercraft or a boat with a headlight. A hovercraft
and a boat do not have wheels, but get the same benefit from a headlight as any
other type of vehicle. The claims are avoided as well by a motorcycle or a bicycle,
which do not have doors but can have a headlight.
You can get broader claims, in this example, by originally presenting your claims
as a circle, as follows:
1.
A vehicle.
2.
Claim 1, with wheels.
3.
Claim 1, with a door.
4.
Claim 1, with a sunroof.
5.
Claim 1, with a headlight.
6.
Claim 1, with a motor.
The examiner will reject claims 1-4, as above, but may allow claim 5 (1 + 5),
which has a feature (a headlight) he or she was unable to find in the prior art. But
claim 5 is broader here than it was in the chain prosecution first shown above. With
this broader claim in your patent, it is infringed by any vehicle that has a headlight,
whether it is a hovercraft, a boat, a motorcycle, a bicycle, or a car that has no sunroof.
With slightly more effort, you can also obtain narrower protection that may be
more resistant to invalidating prior art by taking all the rejected claims and making
them depend from allowable claim 5. The resulting claims are:
1.
A vehicle.
(cancelled)
2.
Claim 5, with wheels.
3.
Claim 5, with a door.
4.
Claim 5, with a sunroof.
5.
A vehicle with a headlight.
6.
Claim 5, with a motor.
Since claim 5 was allowable, any claim depending from claim 5 also is allowable.
An infringer will have a harder time avoiding the circle of claims resulting from
making each dependent claim depend directly from the independent claim. All the
claims listed above yielded only by claiming a circle are as broad or broader than the
broadest claims obtained by chain claiming, and cover the subject matter much more
comprehensively.
Thus, I recommend that claims be written as follows:
* Identify each feature or combination of a minimum number of features
that is not shown in the prior art (in other words, find each combination
having just one feature distinguishing each prior art reference);
* Write independent claims for each individually novel feature and for
each combination including exactly one novel feature;
* Write dependent claims to the extent desired claiming more than one
novel feature (this can be done after prosecution has revealed which
independent claims are regarded as patentable, providing there is a
basis for each dependent claim in the original specification);
* Write dependent claims to the extent desired claiming narrower versions
of the single feature in each independent claim (this also can be done
after the broad claims are prosecuted).
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This plan is not as complicated as it may look at first blush. The main idea is
that the broadest claims submitted commonly should differ from each of the closest
prior art references by just one feature. The differentiating feature should be
different enough that there is some hope of proving nonobviousness, but when in
doubt, claim broadly and fight for patentability.
Why should each broadest claim differ by only one feature from each prior art
reference? Because, at least in my experience, an examiner will generally allow a
case if the claim has one element the examiner cannot find in the prior art, or one
element the examiner cannot bring into the main reference by properly combining
another reference. "To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three basic
criteria must be met . . . .[Tihe prior art reference (or references when combined)
57
must teach or suggest allthe claim limitations."
On the other hand, even a large number of individually obvious features,
combined in one claim, will not necessarily make it patentable.5 8 So the goal is to
find each single feature or single element in a combination that makes a difference to
patentability and capture each one in a claim that has no nonessential limitations.
When writing dependent claims, claim a circle, adding each limitation directly to
the independent claim. Save chain claiming for variants of the same limitation, like
numerical ranges and genus/subgenus/species claims. Finally, do not necessarily
present the narrowest dependent claims that you are willing to accept when you file
the application. At least get the broadest claims right, and provide a lot of small
fallbacks in your specification, so you can bring new features into the claims after
you have prosecuted the broad claims to find out what is patentable.

V. THE EXAMINER IS NEVER WRONG

This is a simple point that is often lost on lawyers. Nobody likes to take a
position, then be forced by someone else to back off. You might think that examiners
are different, since they almost always reject every claim on the first action, but
ultimately most applications issue as patents. My experience is that examiners are
just as reluctant to retract an initial position as anyone else.
Examiners can be as reluctant to change position as they desire. The PTO
productivity incentives give examiners more of an incentive to reject claims,
especially in the first application, than to allow claims. If the examiner pushes the
applicant into a continuation, the examiner will get more credit for less work, since
the first action in a continuation yields the same credit as first action in an original
application, for less work.
But lawyers are taught to argue, and they commonly take an explicit position
that the examiner is wrong about a rejection: "I am right and you are wrong." How
can you make any progress during examination without gainsaying the examiner,
especially when, as is often the case, the examiner has not given the first rejection
much thought, and there are holes in it?

57

MPEP, supra note 39, at § 2142 (emphasis added).

See In -re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming a rejection based on a
combination of thirteen references).
58
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A better approach is to recognize that you don't need to prove the examiner is
wrong to get allowance; you merely need to prove that the prior art isn't good enough.
In other words, focus on the prior art, not the examiner. It is the prior art's fault that
the rejection will not hold up.
Do not answer a rejection like most people do, which is something like this:
The examiner rejected claim 1 as anticipated by the Smith reference. The
applicant respectfully traverses this rejection. The examiner erred in rejecting
the claims because the examiner has not pointed to any reference to the
tabulating lever of claim 1 in the Smith reference.
Why not answer this way? You are telling the examiner he or she is wrong for
rejecting the claim. The examiner has to accept blame to allow the claim. Instead,
say this:
The Smith reference does not anticipate, as the reference fails to show the
tabulating lever recited in claim 1. Therefore claim 1 is patentable.
The difference in the second response is that you are not saying the examiner
has a problem; Smith simply failed to anticipate. In sum, don't personalize your
attack as a failing of the examiner. You ca not (validly) patent water, even if you are
nice to the examiner, but you will get nowhere if you annoy the examiner.

VI. CITE THE MPEP, NOT CASE LAW

A fact often overlooked about the MPEP, the PTO policy manual governing the
examiner's work, is that it now contains many reasons why the examiner should
allow your claims. Chapter 2100 of the MPEP is a more-recently introduced section
covering what an examiner must do to establish a prima facie case of obviousness,
show the claim is indefinite, address functional claim limitations, etc. One of my
favorite quotes from chapter 2100 of the MPEP is this:
To establish a prima faede case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be
met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the
references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of
ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference
teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success.
Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or
suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the
claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be
59
found in the prior art, and not based on applicant's disclosure.
Many first Office actions do not meet one or more of the quoted requirements.
As a lawyer you know, particularly if you look at the Foreword of the MPEP,
that the MPEP is not the highest authority. The Patent Act, Title 35 of the United
59 MPEP, supra note 39, at § 2142.
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States Code, 60 is the law of the land, and Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations 61
has the force of law unless it contradicts the statute. As a lawyer, you know that a
statute trumps a contrary rule, and statutes and rules both trump the MPEP. You
get your arguments respecting the meaning of the statutes and rules from case law,
whenever possible, relying on the rule of stare decisis.
But examiners are not lawyers; most of them do not go to law school before or
during their careers as examiners in the USPTO. Examiners learn that everything
they need to know about patent law is in the MPEP. They are unfamiliar with how
to find, cite, and use cases. An examiner may not know, for example, that a Federal
Circuit opinion written after the 1952 patent statute was enacted should carry more
weight than a 1910 district court opinion relying on a different statute altogether.
To an examiner, arguments based on case law carry little weight. Furthermore,
many examiners view a lawyer's argument relying on case law as fast-talking or
talking down to the examiner: "I'm a lawyer and you are not, so you must obey me."
This attitude overlooks the fact that the examiner has the upper hand during regular
prosecution.
These problems can be avoided by relying on authority of any kind only when
you need to do so. When you do need to rely on authority, use the MPEP, whenever
possible. The examiner can look up the quote at his or her desk, so the examiner
doesn't need to worry whether you are quoting out of context, or using one favorable
case and failing to mention other unfavorable decisions on point. Additionally, you
are citing the one authority the examiner has been told to accept. If you are tempted
to rely on a case, at least look in the MPEP case index to see if the same argument
has been imported into the MPEP, and thus validated in the eyes of the examiner. If
so, cite the MPEP, even if the cited text is quoted from the case.
Again, just use the MPEP cite as a starting point for an argument that the prior
art is deficient, the claim is definite, or the like. Do not lecture the examiner on the
law.

VII. DON'T PILE ON CLAIM LIMITATIONS OR PATENTABILITY ARGUMENTS.
This is based on a true story; the specific facts have been changed, but the
situation occurs frequently.
A prosecutor obtained a patent, and litigators from another firm ended up
enforcing it. The original independent claim filed in the patent application recited a
salt composition including additive A. During prosecution the claim in question was
rejected, so the prosecutor amended the claim by requiring additive A to have a
particular particle size range - 5 to 50 microns. The rejection was maintained, so
the prosecutor further amended the claim to recite additive B as well as additive A.
The examiner found the addition of additive B persuasive, so the claim issued in a
patent. Claim 1 as patented thus recited the particle size range of additive A and the
presence of additive B.
During enforcement of the patent, the scope of A and B was easily interpreted.
The only claim construction issue related to the scope of the particle size range. The
60 35 U.S.C. (2003).
(1 37 C.F.R. (2003).
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debate was whether the claim meant that (1) the average particle size was between 5
and 50 microns, or (2) every particle had to be between 5 and 50 microns in size.
The accused infringer, when developing the accused product, employed a salt
composition including additives A and B. The accused infringer attempted to design
around by merely circumventing the particle size range limitation, by using a
mixture of half 25-micron particles and half 200-micron particles, and urged the
second claim interpretation above. Thus, the lawsuit could have been lost because of
a dispute concerning the particle size range amendment, which did nothing to get the
claim allowed.
There are two morals to this story. First, when possible, interview with an
examiner before putting an amendment in the claim, to see if it is likely to make the
claim allowable. Not all examiners will give such an indication, but do this if you
believe it will be effective with a given examiner. Second, if a limitation proves
ineffective to avoid the prior art, don't leave it in the claim. Take it back out of the
broadest claim. Otherwise it may give an infringer an easy way to circumvent the
claim.
Similarly, add just one limitation to the claim at a time by amendment. If you
want to try more alternatives, write each alternative into a different claim. You
again want to find each single amendment that yields patentable subject matter, so
your claims will be as broad as possible.
Further, when you are presenting a patentability argument, and you have
identified several reasons why you can argue the claim is allowable over the prior
art, you don't need to make all the arguments at once. For example, assume you can
argue that claim 1 has three limitations that the Jones prior art lacks. If you argue
that each of the three limitations distinguishes claim 1 from Jones, you have just
relied upon each of the three arguments to avoid the Jones prior art. You have no
hope of arguing that an accused device has the equivalent of any of the three
limitations, at least under Festo ff62 as we know it.
On the other hand, if you only make one of the arguments, and the claim is
allowed, you have not argued the other two distinctions over Jones to establish
patentability. In court, the litigator can always raise these other distinctions if
needed, in a context (outside the PTO) that does not generate an estoppel. But you
have preserved two equivalents positions that otherwise would be foreclosed. Of
course, a still more enlightened course, when you can avoid the best prior art by
asserting any of three different limitations, would be to present three claims, each
including just one of the three limitations.

VIII. DON'T WRITE YOUR OPPONENTS' TRIAL EXHIBITS

This is another tip that comes from working closely with litigators in our firm.
Litigators are always looking for a single document that makes their point for them.
If you need to show two, three, or four documents to make a point, it is a much
weaker point. Also, litigators have a trick, when they have a "smoking gun"
document that does the whole job. They keep that document in front of the
factfinder. For example, if the smoking gun is used in a PowerPoint® slide, the
(32Festo

l 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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litigator may put the smoking gun up last, and leave the projector on. Alternatively,
the document may be put on a trial board that always seems to be on top of the stack,
and visible to the jury. That one document, out of thousands, may have an
inordinate impact on the result of the case.
Many of us have been inadvertently trained to write smoking guns during
patent prosecution. For example, here is a classic Office Action response, in the
remarks submitted when amending a claim:
The examiner has rejected claim 1 as anticipated by the Smith reference.
Claim I has been amended to remove this anticipation by an amendment
reciting a tabulating lever. The Smith reference shows no tabulating lever. As
amended, the claim is allowable over the Smith reference.
What is wrong with this? You have plainly stated in your own words, in a short
passage, that the examiner rejected your claim based on the Smith prior art, and you
amended the claim as a result. This would look fine for the accused infringer on a
billboard in the courtroom.
Another approach, assuming the same claim amendment was made, would be to
write the following remark:
The examiner has asked the applicant to show that Claim I is patentable in
view of the prior art. Claim I recites a tabulating lever, which the Smith
reference fails to show. Claim I is therefore patentable over the Smith
reference.
Why is this better? It makes the same argument without drawing any attention
at all to two negative facts: that the claim was REJECTED as ANTICIPATED, and
then was AMENDED to avoid the rejection. The main message is that the Smith
reference is inferior. Also, this approach makes patent prosecution between the
prosecutor and the examiner a win-win scenario. The examiner did not reject you;
the examiner just challenged you to show that the invention is patentable over the
closest prior art.
To prove what happened here, a challenger must show the claim was amended
by reference to one or more marked up claims and the examiner's rejection, as well as
your statement. In fact, you can avoid even presenting a marked up claim under the
current rules, so all the connecting links would need to be arguments or documents
prepared by the litigator, instead of prosecution documents.
Of course, during litigation, a litigator can still show that you did amend the
claim, and that the feature of your invention avoiding the Smith reference is your
tabulating lever. This tip will not make all your problems go away, but it at least
puts a more positive spin on the amendment, and makes the infringer's job a lot
harder. It eliminates the smoking gun document.
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DON'T JUST OBTAIN A PATENT; BUILD A PATENT POSITION

A patent claim is like a brick - generally useless as a shelter, no matter how
big it is. Ten patent claims are like ten bricks. There is no way to keep warm in a
house consisting of ten bricks scattered around you with gaps between them: the
wind will get around them and go straight to you. Even ten thousand bricks, if
positioned with gaps between them, will not keep you warm. But a well-made
portfolio of patent claims, blocking every gap in your patent position, is like a brick
house made of an unbroken wall encircling you, with a solid roof above. The wind
can't get you then, even if you are in a hurricane.
Of course, not every patent portfolio can be like a perfectly mortared, virtually
airtight brick house. Prior art creates gaps in coverage that can not always be filled.
But you do have a variety of claims at your command. Use all that are applicable to
build the best shelter possible for your client. As I have indicated above, take pains
to write the broadest available claims. Write many independent claims, each ideally
having a different, single distinction over the closest prior art.
Do not stop until you have the broadest available claims of all available types.
Claim the widgets your client sells, the widgets your client's competitor sells, the
process your client uses to make the widgets, the sub-widgets the client assembles to
make complete widgets, the process in which your client's customers use the widgets
to make widget subassemblies, the widget subassemblies, etc. Claim the business
method your client uses to distribute the widgets efficiently. Claim the surface finish
on the widgets that makes them better. Get design patents on your client's widgets
with surface ornamentation. Get claims with means-plus-function limitations,
conventional structural claims, claims with non-means-plus-function functional
elements, method claims, composition claims, and improvement claims.
You may choose to start by patenting what your client sells. If you succeed in
that endeavor, however, do not stop trying to come up with more claims, particularly
by thinking about how competitors will try to circumvent your existing claims and by
filling those gaps with more bricks and mortar.
As the market for the invention develops, follow the choices that your client and
other manufacturers make, and write narrower claims covering those detailed
embodiments more narrowly. I call these "niche claims" - narrow claims that happen
to cover the "sweet spots" representing what your client and competitors are doing
commercially right now. These niche claims, being narrow, are more protected
against the prior art, and yet cover what the competition is doing. A single niche
claim is easily avoided, but a brick wall of many niche claims, covering many
desirable alternatives, is much harder to avoid. And since each niche claim,
individually, is narrow, they are all difficult to invalidate. You actually can have a
broad patent position made up largely of narrow niche claims.
Even during litigation, continue to prosecute claims that fix problems found
during litigation. Sometimes you can even issue new patents that solve problems in
the litigation, and get those patents added to the litigation.
When you are obtaining an extensive patent position, there are several pitfalls
you must avoid. First, you need to pay special attention to avoiding double patenting
problems. Double patenting has two aspects - same-invention-type double patenting
and obviousness-type double patenting.
To remedy obviousness-type double
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patenting, use terminal disclaimers liberally. Since most patent families now will
expire at the same time, after 20 years, a terminal disclaimer will not even cost you
any patent term, in must cases. If, however, your patent family comes to contain
improvement patents not supported by the specifications of your earliest filed
applications, you may want to:
" Avoid putting any obvious variants of the previous claims in the
improvement patent application,
" Avoid claiming priority to the original application if it doesn't do you any
good anyway. Remember that the original application must support at
least one complete claim you are asserting in your continuing
application. Otherwise the claim to priority has no value and hastens
the expiration of the continuation.
" Keep in mind as well that you can file a terminal disclaimer after a
patent has issued.
To avoid same-invention-type double patenting, you need to write all your claims
in an organized form that allows you to compare them easily. Keep track of all the
claims in all related cases in one plan. In your plan, write all the dependent claims
in independent form, including all the limitations of the antecedent claims. That
way, you can detect same invention double patenting arising through different
combinations in dependent claims.
Another point relating to prosecuting of families of patents: which claims should
you emphasize early in prosecution, and which should wait until later? Under the
twenty-years-from-filing patent term, you might wonder why anyone would wait to
file continuing and divisional patent applications for initially divided out and rejected
claims until prosecution of a preceding application was concluded. After all, this
reduces the effective term of your later patents, now that a patent expires twenty
years after the priority application was filed, regardless of how long one waits to file
and prosecute the later case.
But there are reasons to not actively prosecute all your divided-out continuing
application claims at once in a barrage of patent applications, many of which are
likely to be assigned to a single Examiner. Examiners have a natural tendency to
allow broader claims in a later-generation case than in the first application filed.
There are at least four reasons for this.
One reason is when you file a first patent application, the examiner has only the
benefit of whatever prior art you have disclosed plus whatever additional prior art
the examiner finds. The examiner, in most instances, has done a relatively short
search, directed only to issued (and perhaps published) United States patent
documents and the broadest claims. Many examiners appreciate that they have seen
only the tip of the iceberg at this time.
When you file a second or third generation application on essentially the same
subject matter, the situation is often much different. If you have carried out Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and foreign patent prosecution, several patent offices have
searched in different databases in different languages. Any third-party patent
applications filed but unpublished and unpatented at the time of your initial
application have issued. Your examiner may have carried out some additional
searching, or at least updated the previous search. At this point, the examiner has
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reason to be more confident that the potential 102(e) prior art 63 has been rooted out.
After five to seven years have elapsed, other related patents may have been tested by
opposition or reexamination procedures. After an examiner feels comfortable that
the necessary prior art is at hand, the examiner has fewer qualms about issuing
broad claims.
A second reason why this strategy has value is that, once the examiner has
allowed some claims, the examiner has taken a position that the application has at
least some merit. Issuing related claims becomes easier for the examiner, as this just
reaffirms the validity of the examiner's earlier position.
A third reason why later prosecution is often easier is that you can focus more
on claims that were cast aside in previous applications. There is only so much an
examiner, or anyone, can do in the limited time the PTO allots for examination of one
patent application. If you carry out more examinations, more claims can be
evaluated and allowed.
A fourth reason why later prosecution is often easier is that if you can develop a
good working relationship with the examiner in earlier cases, the relationship will
work to your benefit in later cases. If the examiner can trust you to be reasonable,
the examiner will be much more likely to consider your ideas on how the claims at
hand can be allowed. Of course, if you play fast and loose with the examiner, it will
have the opposite effect.
Moreover, even if the examiner proves intractable, you can isolate and appeal
rejected claims or present experimental evidence in some applications without
bringing your entire program to a halt, as you at least have some of the claims
needed to make a portfolio. Your competitors need to overcome your first line of
defense, and worry about what claims in your pipeline will issue in the future and
create additional problems.
To take advantage of the comparative ease of subsequent prosecution, while
keeping your options open, it makes sense to keep at least one application pending in
important cases, even after you are running out of new ideas for claims that are
likely to be patentable. One reason for keeping the tree alive, after you think you
have harvested all the apples, is that you may find a way to "recapture" and patent a
claim you conceded (or failed to think of) earlier in prosecution.
If you need to go into reissue, you can only broaden your claims within two years
after the original patent was granted, 64 but there is no such rule for a continuation of
original prosecution. 65 Also, you are prohibited from recapturing ground given up
during original prosecution in a reissue application, 66 even if you are not broadening
the claims or you are acting within two years. Again, no such rule constrains
continuation applications claiming priority to the first pertinent application.
Moreover, your competitors do not accrue any intervening rights that restrict the
enforcement of a continuation application.
If you keep track of what your competitors are doing, you can attempt to write
claims supported by an early priority date and reading upon your competitors'
products and processes. Of course, if you do this, do tell the PTO about the pertinent
63

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2002).

(3435 U.S.C. § 251 (2003).
65 See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1999).

(3 In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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competitors' activity you are monitoring. Follow the industry and your competitors,
and adapt your claims to them.
Now I will address two other pitfalls to be avoided when prosecuting a family of
patents in your quest to obtain a comprehensive patent position. Two cases in
particular impose new requirements on a prosecutor who harvests patent rights from
an application while filing continuation cases to mine further content out of the
67
patent, as I am suggesting.
The MeGrew case requires a prosecutor to be diligent in finding and addressing
claims published or issued by third parties, and copying those claims into the
prosecutor's own application if the application supports the claims and the applicant
may be the first inventor. 68 The absolute deadline for copying claims is one year from
the time the claims are published or issued. 69 If the prosecutor fails to copy the claims
in time, even if the applicant is legally the first inventor, the applicant is not entitled to
these claims, and thus these claims will represent gaps in the patent position that
cannot be filled.
In MeGrew, the applicant admitted that he was presenting claims to the same
invention addressed by claims in the Takeuchi patent. 70 The Takeuchi patent was
issued more than one year earlier, although McGrew claimed priority to an application
pre-dating Takeuchi. 7 1 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's rejection of the
appealed claims on the sole ground that they are barred under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)
because they were not made within one year of the granting of another United States
patent claiming the same or substantially the same subject matter.7 2 The case applied
35 U.S.C. § 135(b) as a "one-year bar" to an applicant who is not in an interference
situation.73
74
The new law amending 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) further complicates this situation.
Now, a claim that is the same or substantially the same as a claim presented in a
published United States patent application must be copied within one year of its
publication date to avoid the 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) one-year bar. 75 Under the McGrew oneyear bar following publication, you should actively work to present in your first
application all the claims you hope someday to patent. When your application is
published, unless your competitors copy claims in time, you will have reserved to
yourself claims that your opponents cannot patent.
35 U.S.C. § 135(b) suggests an additional strategy to place obstacles in the way of
competitors. Assume your client is far from developing the invention you are to patent.
Assume the inventor can identify the elements a successful product needs to have, but
has not yet figured out how to enable those elements, or in a chemical case has not

67 See In re McGrew, 120 F.3d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med.,
Educ. & Research Found., 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
68 In reMcGrew, 120 F.3d at 1237.
6 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (2000).
70 In re McGrew, 120 F.3d at 1237.

71Id.
72 Id.

Id.; see also In ro Berger, 279 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (applying the rule of In ro MeGrow).
w 35 U.S.C. §135(b) (2000)
73

75 Id.
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discovered any utility for the invention. In other words, you know what to claim, but
77
you can't write a description that satisfies 35 U.S.C. §§ 10176 and 112.
One strategy you might employ is to claim the invention, even though you can't
support it yet. I will refer to such unsupported claims as "blue-sky claims." When your
application is published, the blue-sky claims as filed will be published, whether or not
they are patentable in your application. This will start the 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) one
year bar running for competitors, even if you never are able to patent these blue-sky
claims. Under current law, this strategy may prevent others who discover how to
satisfy 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 from patenting the blue-sky claims in their own
applications, unless they copy these blue-sky claims into their own applications within
one year after they are published. Those unaware of this issue may be reluctant to copy
claims they can't support. This may work to your benefit.
Of course, this strategy might be argued to be unfair to third parties if carried to an
extreme, and the law may in the future develop a remedy to address this problem. But
the law hasn't developed yet, so this strategy may have some appeal until that point is
reached.

X. PROSECUTION LACHES

Now I will address another problem you need to be aware of when prosecuting a
family of patents: "prosecution laches."
In Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Res. Found., LP,78 the Federal
Circuit held that the long dormant defense of prosecution laches remains viable. "[A]s
a matter of law, the equitable doctrine of laches may be applied to bar enforcement of
patent claims that issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in
79
prosecution even though the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and rules."

The Federal Circuit relied in part on Webster,80 summarizing that decision by
proclaiming that "a two-year delay was prima facie evidence of unreasonableness." 81
However, in Crown Cork & Sea] Co. v. FerdinandGuttmann Co., "the Court held that
the presumptive two-year time limit of Webster was dictum because it was 'not
82
directly applicable to the precise question of laches upon which the case turned."'

Prosecution laches has largely been directed at the up-to-forty-year submarine
patent strategy attributed to the most famous accused American patent submariner
- Jerome Lemelson,8 3 and to clear abuses of the privilege of filing continuation
76 35 U.S.C. §101 (1952).
7735 U.S.C. §112 (1975).
78 Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Res. Found., LP, 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
97Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1363.
80Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 264 U.S. 463 (1924).
8I Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1364.
82 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Guttman Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167 (1938).
83 Mark A. Lemley, An EmpiriealStudy of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369,
379 (1994) (discussing the most famous holder of 'submarine patents', Jerome Lemelson.). Lemelson
holds nearly 500 U.S. patents on a range of inventions. Among his patents are U.S. Patent No.
5,177,645 (issued Jan. 5, 1993) with a pendency of thirty-eight years; U.S. Patent 5,351,078 (issued
September 27, 1994) with a pendency of nearly forty years; and U.S. Patent No. 5,283,641 (issued
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applications by refiling an application repeatedly without prosecuting it.84 Of course,
now that patents only last twenty years from the earliest claimed priority date, you
can't run a submarine campaign as long as Jerome Lemelson did. But the Lemelson
decision does not limit itself to a campaign of more than twenty years, and the recent
case of In re Bogese affirmed a finding of prosecution laches by the PTO for a series
of applications extending seventeen years.8 5 Are you subject to a laches defense if
you file a continuation or two more than would be necessary to obtain a patent?
Probably not, but there is no defined safe harbor as yet.
Both MeGrew and Lemeison are ideally avoided by the following approach:
* present all your claims right away,
* continue to maintain all rejected claims until it is clear that they cannot
be allowed, and
* permit all claims to issue as soon as they are found allowable; fight for
the broader claims in separate continuing applications.
In addition to avoiding prosecution laches, if your published application contains
broad claims at an early date, under MeGrew you will be creating a one-year time
clock for others, even before any of your claims issues in a patent.8 6 You may be able
to pre-empt the field broadly, as you don't need to get the claims allowed to poison
the well. You can simply publish them.

XI. REISSUE, DON'T REEXAMINE

I have already advised that the best approach to improve your patent position is
to keep an application pending that claims priority back to your earliest cases. But
what if you have no pending continuation, either because you were previously
unaware of that strategy, or because you inherited a patent prosecuted by someone
else, and different claims are needed? If you are confronted with a choice whether to
reissue or reexamine your patent, usually reissue is the better course.
Reissue applications, until relatively recently, were extremely unpalatable to
most people, except in the instance where new, problematic prior art was discovered
after the original patent issued. The reason was simple - the applicant had to
provide a very detailed recitation of every alleged error, specifying what was the
error, when the error occurred, and when and under what circumstances it was
discovered. 8 7 The MPEP states:
Reissue oaths or declarations must point out specifically what the defects are
and how and when the errors arose, and how and when errors were
discovered. If additional defects or errors are discovered after filing and
during the examination of the application, a supplemental reissue oath or
declaration must be filed pointing our such defects or errors and how and
February 1, 1994) with a pendency of thirty-nine years. Lemelson has at least fifteen patents that

stem from a single application on December 24, 1954.
81In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Id.

85 Jd
86 In re McGrew 120 F.3d 1236, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
87 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (1992).
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when they arose and how and when they were discovered. Any change or
departure from the original specification or claims represents an "error" in
the original patent under 35 U.S.C. 251 and must be addressed in the
original, or a supplemental, reissue oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.175.88
In many instances, the error was pinned on the prosecuting attorney, which
often made life very difficult for that attorney. It is easy for a client to start from the
proposition that an attorney has confessed error and leap to the conclusion that he or
she is incompetent. The inventors were not happy if the error was blamed on them,
either. The PTO often requested more and more particulars, and any new rejection
requiring an amendment led to the identification of an additional error that had to be
confessed. Writing and filing an acceptable oath often dominated the reissue process.
Fortunately, the bad old days of reissue are over.8 9 Now, the applicant need only
identify one error, even if more than one error is being corrected:
Applicant need only specify in the reissue oath/declaration one of the errors
upon which reissue is based. Where applicant specifies one such error, this
requirement of a reissue oath/declaration is satisfied ....

It is not necessary,

however, to point out how (or when) the error arose or occurred. Further, it is
not necessary to point out how (or when) the error was discovered. 90
The specified error can be of a very minor or innocuous character, such as that
one narrow claim is missing a word, or new prior art was discovered after the original
patent issued. That's it. You do not need a donkey to pin the tail to.
After that, at the end of prosecution you simply file a supplemental oath stating
that all the other errors were made without deceptive intent. No gory details are
necessary at any time. You no longer need to write your opponent's Exhibit A to
reform your patent.
Of course, you can still reexamine your patent, which does not require you to
allege an error, though you do need to find a substantial new question of
patentability. Most applicants favor not admitting an error. But now that the
onerous oath has been overturned, other advantages of reissue become more
important.
Today, reissue has several advantages over reexamination.
* You can file broader claims than those within the original patent within
two years; if you broaden in some respects, you can later broaden in
other respects.
* You can address more types of errors. Reexamination must be based on
new published or patented prior art.
Reissue can be based on
unpublished art (like public use or "on sale" activity), errors under 35
U.S.C. § 112, typographical errors, inventorship errors, and others.

88 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1414 (6th
ed. 1995).
89 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (1997).
9i0MPEP, supra note 39, at § 1414.

[3:034 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

*

Reexamination is concluded in one proceeding, generally allowing only
two Office actions and no continuation practice.
You can file a
continuation of a reissue application.
* Once ordered to proceed, no one can abandon a reexamination. The
procedure necessarily ends in a certificate passing judgment on the
claims. If you stop prosecuting while the claims are rejected, the claims
are cancelled. A reissue application can be abandoned, though one needs
to think about what one says in a reissue application, to avoid
embarrassment if the proceeding is later abandoned. Your competitors
have access to the file.
" Anyone can track a reexamination on the public Patent Application
Information Retrieval ("PAIR") system.
For some reason, reissue
applications are not available on the public PAIR system, even though
you do have access to the paper file.
The single problem with reissue is that, despite what you read in the MPEP, it is
very slow. Reissue applications commonly are pending for several years before being
issued.
Reissue practice has become more popular today than reexamination practice.
You can see this by looking in the Official Gazette 91 each week, where the PTO
publishes a notice of each reissue application and each request for reexamination a
few months after it is filed. You will find today that there are usually, if not always,
far more reissue applications than reexaminations.
This reverses the trend,
compared to before the reissue rule was liberalized.
Finally, what if some claims in a patent are clearly invalid, others are not, and
your client does not want to undergo the costs and risks of additional prosecution in a
reissue or reexamination? In this instance, if you do not seek additional patent
claims, you can do what you want to do by disclaiming the clearly invalid claims.
In sum, if you need to correct a patent, reconsider using reissue practice, or in
some instances a disclaimer, instead of reissue.

X. CONCLUSION

I hope I have given you at least some new ideas about how you can prosecute
patents more successfully. Consider using some of them in your daily practice. Once
again, the nine tips are:
* Tip #1: Write Claims That Will Be Literally Infringed
* Tip #2: Don't Rely Too Heavily On Means-Plus-Function Claims
* Tip #3: Write The Specification Expansively
* Tip #4: Claim In A Circle, Not In A Chain
" Tip #5: The Examiner Is Never Wrong.
" Tip #6: Cite The MPEP, Not Case Law.
" Tip #7: Don't Pile On Claim Limitations Or Patentability Arguments.
" Tip #8: Don't Write Your Opponents' Trial Exhibits.
* Tip #9: Don't Just Obtain A Patent; Build A Patent Position

91 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office

